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				INTRODUCTION     
				Involuntary discharge from employment often comes as a surprise 
				to an employee. The question that arises in such circumstances 
				is whether the employee has any legal recourse. Many employees 
				who believe that they were unfairly terminated mistakenly assume 
				that they have a right to reinstatement, and a remedy for 
				consequential damages, including back pay. Whether such rights 
				and remedies exist often depends on how the courts apply the 
				well known but often-assailed at-will employment doctrine or one 
				of its numerous exceptions.     
				The at-will employment doctrine basically provides that an 
				employer may terminate an at-will employee at any time, for a 
				good reason, for a bad reason, or for no reason at all. 
				Wisconsin has followed this general rule since the nineteenth 
				century case of Prentice v. Ledyard, 28 Wis 131 (1877). The 
				logic is that unless otherwise agreed, all employment is 
				presumed to be for an indefinite term, terminable at the will or 
				whim of either the employer or the employee without advance 
				notice. Each day constitutes a new agreement, neither creating 
				rights nor duties from one party to the other.     
				There are many exceptions, so numerous that they almost, but not 
				quite, swallow the rule. The exceptions fall into several 
				categories. 
				ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS     
				Termination from employment is wrongful if it is in violation of 
				federal or state anti-discrimination laws based on age, race, 
				creed, color, handicap, marital status, sex, national origin, 
				ancestry, arrest record, conviction record, membership in the 
				national guard, state defense force or any reserve component of 
				the military forces, or use or nonuse of lawful products off the 
				employer's premises during nonworking hours. See for example, 
				Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 
				1981; the federal Age Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 
				621; the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
				12111; and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, Wis. Stats. 
				Section 111.321-111.395. See also statutes proscribing 
				termination based on an employee's union activities, National 
				Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 and Wis. Stats. Section 
				111.06(1) (c)1; jury service, Wis. Stats. Section 756.25(1); 
				wage garnishment, Wis. Stats. Section 812.235; refusal to submit 
				to honesty testing, Wis.Stats. Section 111.37(4); being 
				subpoenaed to testify at an OSHA proceeding, Wis.Stats. Section 
				101.595; or suffering a compensable worker's compensation 
				illness or injury, Wis. Stats. Section 102.35.      
				The assertion that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee 
				because the employee made a worker's compensation claim requires 
				proof that the employer, without reasonable cause, refused to 
				rehire an employee who was injured in the course of employment, 
				even though suitable employment was available within the 
				employee's work restrictions. Such claims are usually quite 
				difficult. The employee must prove the employment status at the 
				time of the compensable work-related injury, the loss of time 
				from work for any reason, an attempt to return to work, a 
				medical release to return to work with or without restrictions, 
				and the employer’s refusal to rehire the employee because of the 
				injury. The employer has the burden of showing reasonable cause 
				for discharge or lack of availability of suitable employment 
				within the employee’s restrictions. See Great Northern Corp. v. 
				LIRC, 189 Wis.2d 313, 525 N.W.2d 361 (Ct. App. 1994) (excessive 
				absenteeism cannot include time off for work-related injury); 
				Ray Hutson Chevrolet, Inc. v. LIRC, 186 Wis.2d 118, 519 N.W.2d 
				713 (Ct. App. 1994) (elimination of job during disability period 
				was justified); Universal Foods Corp. v. LIRC, 161 Wis.2d 1, 467 
				N.W.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1992) 
				(employer could not meet its burden that employee was unable to 
				do the work and that no other suitable work was available). 
				Other case examples follow: Dalco Metal Products v. LIRC, 142 
				Wis2d 595, 419 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1987) (Employee was injured, 
				went to doctor, returned to work without restrictions, and third 
				day later was fired allegedly for poor production– court held 
				for employee); Link Industries, Inc. v. LIRC, 141 Wis.2d 551, 
				415 N.W.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1987)(Employee cut finger, obtained 
				bandage, went to emergency room, returned to work next day, and 
				took off the following day to see personal doctor. Employee was 
				fired following day. Court held for employee); West Allis School 
				Distr. v. DILHR, 116 Wis.2d 410, 342 N.W.2d 415 (1984) (Back 
				injury. Prior to return to work, employer took steps to lay 
				employee off. Employer had no intention of allowing employee to 
				return to work indefinitely. Less than one month after return to 
				work, employee was laid off permanently, and replaced by new 
				worker. Court held that lay-off was in bad faith); L& H Wrecking 
				Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 339 N.W.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983) 
				(Back injury. Termination during healing period. Firing based 
				solely on existence of injury without benefit of competent 
				medical opinion that injury would permanently prevent return to 
				work. Court held for employee).     
				A further discussion of anti-discrimination laws is beyond the 
				scope of this essay. 
				GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEE LAWS     
				The law governing termination from governmental employment is 
				different from the law governing termination from private, 
				non-governmental employment. Certain constitutional and 
				statutory provisions create property rights to continued 
				employment that cannot be infringed without due process of law. 
				See Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
				(1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Arneson 
				v. Jezwinski, 217 Wis.2d 288, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999)      
				The discussion will be limited to contract and tort law. An 
				outline of the law is provided so that parties may consider 
				their rights.  
				CONTRACT LAW     
				The general principle underlying the employment at-will doctrine 
				allows no remedy to the employee for discharge from employment. 
				If the general rule applies, and no exceptions apply, the 
				employer may terminate an employee with impunity and without 
				advance notice. Likewise, an employee may quit the employment 
				for any reason and without notice. There is no remedy to the 
				aggrieved party in either case.     
				Despite the existence, ubiquity and notoriety of the general 
				rule, there is much litigation regarding wrongful discharge. 
				Express contracts and implied contracts can be created through 
				employment handbooks, company rules and policy documents. When 
				an employer assures the employee that the employee is employed 
				for a definite period of time, the employee has grounds for a 
				wrongful discharge claim if prematurely fired without "just 
				cause." Likewise, if an employer assures the employee that the 
				employee will not be discharged unless just cause exists, such 
				as violation of company policy or rules made apparent to the 
				employee, the employer may be subject to a wrongful discharge 
				cause of action for arbitrary termination of the employee.
				     
				In Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N. W. 2d 666 (1985), 
				the supreme court held that an employee handbook could modify an 
				at-will employment relationship, and create a right to continued 
				employment indefinitely, in the absence of just cause for 
				discharge. The employee was hired as a hotel security guard on 
				an at-will basis, but soon thereafter was asked by the hotel to 
				sign a statement in an employee handbook that spelled out all 
				the terms and conditions of employment, including discharge 
				procedures. The employee handbook recited the policies and rules 
				of the employment and Ferraro's acceptance of those regulations 
				as a condition of his continued employment. In addition, the 
				handbook provided a layoff procedure based on seniority; 
				distinctions between probationary and non-probationary 
				employees, including disciplinary procedures; a progressive 
				procedure for discipline based on the number and seriousness of 
				rule violations; discharge only for "just cause"; and a promise 
				from Ferraro that he would provide a two-week notice before 
				leaving the employment.      
				In this case, the court held that the rules and procedures to 
				which both parties had agreed in writing, and for which 
				consideration was given, created an express contract between the 
				parties. When Ferraro subsequently abused a hotel guest for a 
				parking violation, the hotel interviewed the guest and other 
				witnesses, determined that there were grounds for discharge, and 
				fired the employee. Ferraro filed suit for wrongful discharge. 
				The supreme court ruled in favor of the hotel, holding that 
				although the handbook constituted an express contract between 
				the parties that eliminated the at-will relationship, there was 
				no credible evidence to show that the hotel breached that 
				contract in any way. The hotel had followed the discharge 
				procedure by performing an investigation of the act and had just 
				cause to discharge the employee. This case is important for the 
				landmark holding that an employment handbook may convert an 
				employment at-will relationship into one that can be terminated 
				only by adherence to contractual terms in the handbook.     
				Sometimes an employer will provide behavioral guidelines to 
				employees that are presumed by some to create express contracts 
				for employment. These usually are not enforced in court, 
				however, unless the employer creates specific rules or 
				procedures for discharge that create an agreed employment 
				relationship made conditional on those terms.      
				In Bantz v. Montgomery Estates, Inc., 163 Wis.2d 973, 473 N.W.2d 
				506 (Ct. App. 1991), an employee claimed that a handbook 
				outlining regulations and disciplinary procedures, an employee 
				conduct policy statement, and a manual prescribing a schedule of 
				progressive discipline converted an employment-at-will 
				relationship to a contractual one that could not be terminated 
				without just cause. The employee was fired from her position as 
				cashier at a resort for allegedly failing to report a miscount 
				in change. The court of appeals held that because the employer's 
				written publications were only "guidelines", and not contractual 
				promises, the at-will relationship endured, and the discharge 
				was not required to be for just cause. Therefore, the employee 
				had no remedy even if the discharge was arbitrary and 
				capricious.     
				In Wolf v. F & M Banks, 193 Wis. 2d 439, 534 N. W. 2d 877 (Ct. 
				App. 1995), an employee sued for wrongful discharge after he was 
				fired for "poor performance." Wolf claimed that his employment 
				had been converted from an at-will relationship to one bound by 
				the terms of a contract formed through a code of ethics document 
				presented to him by the employer. According to the code, Wolf 
				was entitled to an explanation of any alleged infraction. Wolf 
				argued that this prevented him from being fired at-will. The 
				court disagreed. The court ruled that an employer does not 
				abandon an at-will relationship simply because an employee is 
				given an explanation of subpar performance and an opportunity to 
				plead his case. The court also noted that Wolf had signed an 
				agreement for an at-will employment relationship and that the 
				code included a clause explicitly stating that no express or 
				other employment relationship or contract was created through 
				the document. There were no specific rules or procedures, but 
				rather, only guidelines in the code, and no express conditions 
				for employment.     
				An implied contract for continued employment in the absence of 
				just cause for discharge may be created by the mutual intent of 
				both parties. In Garvey v. Buhler, 146 Wis2d. 281, 430 N.W. 2d 
				616 (Ct. App. 1988), Garvey sued Open Pantry for wrongful 
				discharge on the basis of breach of implied contract, created 
				between Open Pantry and Garvey through a combination of 
				documents, including a liquor sales policy, company rules, 
				employee manuals, and her understanding of a warning policy. 
				Garvey claimed that there was a pink slip warning procedure 
				providing that an employee could be fired only after three pink 
				slips, and that she had not been afforded that leniency. She 
				also claimed that the employee manuals and policy guidelines 
				created an implied contract that she could not be discharged 
				at-will. The court held that only the pink slip procedure would 
				have created an implied contract, but the facts regarding the 
				matter were in dispute, so summary judgment was inappropriate. 
				No express contract were formed through the handbooks or sales 
				policies, but an implied contract, if proven, would be just as 
				enforceable.      
				If the fired employee cannot prove the existence of a contract 
				and its breach by circumstantial evidence, the alternative 
				approach is to argue a violation of tort law. 
				TORT LAW     
				An employer's violation of public policy in terminating an 
				employee may give rise to an actionable wrongful discharge 
				claim. The courts will not allow an employer to fire an employee 
				for refusing to break the law. This can be referred to as the 
				public policy exception to the at-will doctrine of employment. 
				There have been many cases where the court’s decision rests on 
				the definition of public policy and how it pertains to the 
				employment situation. Employees may be awarded reinstatement and 
				back pay if they can show that they were discharged for refusing 
				to violate a public policy. However, as explained in Brockmeyer 
				v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N. W. 2d 834 (1983), 
				the public policy in question must be well defined and supported 
				by statutory or constitutional law.      
				In Brockmeyer, the court narrowed the scope of public policy to 
				existing law and decided that wrongful discharge could not be 
				based on a bad faith claim. Brockmeyer was having an open affair 
				with his secretary, who, after being caught, was then asked to 
				find work elsewhere in the company. After no alternative 
				positions in the company were found, the company asked for and 
				obtained her resignation. The former secretary filed a sex 
				discrimination claim against the company. Dun & Bradstreet then 
				asked Brockmeyer to submit a report about the events that led to 
				the secretary’s discharge. Brockmeyer refused and was fired, 
				just days after a settlement with the secretary. Brockmeyer sued 
				for wrongful discharge on the grounds that the employer had a 
				bad faith motivation for his discharge. The court rejected his 
				claim, holding that good faith is not required in employment 
				termination decisions. The court also clearly defined a public 
				policy exception to the rule permitting an at-will employment to 
				be terminated without a good reason. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
				ruled an employer may not discharge an at-will employee if the 
				discharge violates a clearly defined, fundamental public policy 
				of the state. In this particular case, Dunn & Bradstreet’s 
				actions did not violate any clearly defined public policy.
				     
				This narrow exception to the at-will rule was devised in order 
				to allow management to maintain control over its business and to 
				avoid frivolous lawsuits. The employee making the claim for 
				wrongful discharge has the burden to identify a specific 
				provision of law that was violated by the employer in 
				consummating the discharge. The burden then shifts to the 
				employer who must prove just cause for the termination. In this 
				case, Brockmeyer failed to show there was a violation of a 
				fundamental public policy.      
				In Wandry v. Bull’s Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 384 N.W. 
				2d 325 (1986), the court provided a guide for wrongful discharge 
				claims premised upon a violation of public policy. Wandry was 
				discharged for not reimbursing her employer the amount of a 
				stolen check she had mistakenly cashed for a customer. In order 
				to win on a wrongful discharge claim, Wandry had to prove she 
				was protected by public policy from such a dismissal. Wandry had 
				to look at the Brockmeyer case and follow some crucial steps to 
				win. First, she was required to identify a fundamental and 
				well-defined public policy backed by statutory or constitutional 
				law. Second, she had to prove that there was a violation of that 
				policy in the discharge. Wandry found a provision in the state 
				statutes, section 103.455, Wis. Stats., that protects employees 
				from employers who seek reimbursement for work-related losses, 
				though the exact wording of the statute did not match Wandry’s 
				case. The court held that an employee who was discharged for 
				refusing to allow her employer to deduct a business loss from 
				her paycheck had a valid cause of action for wrongful discharge.     
				The court narrowed this public policy exception in Bushko v. 
				Miller Brewing Co.,134 Wis.2d 136, 396 N.W. 2d 167 (1986). In 
				this case, Bushko complained numerous times to management about 
				the company’s alleged unlawful acts of hazardous disposal, 
				safety policies, and record keeping. He subsequently was fired 
				and sued for wrongful discharge under the public policy 
				exception. The court ruled that the exception did not apply in 
				his case because he was not asked or encouraged to act or 
				participate in the alleged illegal acts. The court referred back 
				to the Brockmeyer case, noting that the public policy exception 
				applies only if the employer demands that the employee 
				contribute to an illegal act, and where that participation is a 
				condition of continued employment. In this case, Bushko was 
				merely obeying the law and though his actions were praiseworthy, 
				he never was asked to partake in the alleged misconduct. 
				     
				It was well established in the above cases that an employee 
				could not be fired for refusing to violate the public policy of 
				this state, as it appears in the state constitution or a 
				statute. An unresolved question existed until 1992, as to 
				whether an employee could be fired for refusing to violate an 
				administrative procedure that appears in the Wisconsin 
				Administrative Code. The public policy definition was expanded 
				to include administrative provisions as well, in Winkelman v. 
				Beloit Mem. Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d12, 483 N.W. 2d 211 (1992). 
				Winkelman was a nurse who had spent 16 years in the maternity 
				ward when she was unexpectedly ordered to "float" to another 
				department of the hospital unfamiliar to her, where additional 
				staffing was needed. She refused to work in that area, believing 
				that she was unqualified to do work outside the maternity ward, 
				and went home. She was later informed that her leaving 
				constituted a voluntary resignation, from which she could not be 
				reinstated. She sued for wrongful discharge, claiming the public 
				policy exception to the at-will employment relationship, and 
				cited a Wisconsin Administrative Code section as support for her 
				recalcitrance. The cited section provided that a registered 
				nurse could be disciplined by the licensing authorities for 
				performing services for which the nurse was not qualified, and 
				that such conduct constituted negligence. The court upheld her 
				refusal to accept the transfer to an alien department for which 
				she was untrained and incompetent, and ruled that her discharge 
				for that reason was wrongful, in violation of administrative 
				code. The significance of the case is the holding that where a 
				fundamental and well-defined public policy is evidenced by an 
				administrative rule, a discharge for refusal to violate that 
				public policy is actionable.     
				The whistle-blower act of an employee, as in Bushko, is a very 
				narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The court 
				in Hausman v. St. Croix Care Center, 214 Wis. 2d 654, 571 N.W. 
				2d 393 (1997),
				
				http://www.wisbar.org/Wis/96-0866.htm distinguished its 
				ruling from the holding in the Bushko case in whistle-blower 
				situations. Hausman was a nurse at a nursing home. She notified 
				the administrators numerous times of apparent neglect and abuse 
				of patients. After the management took no action, Hausman 
				informed a state official in charge of investigation of nursing 
				home practices, in accordance with several statutes regarding 
				abuse and neglect in nursing homes. According to the statutes, 
				nurses were obligated to inform the state or local officials in 
				case of any such abuse. Moreover, a nurse's failure to do so 
				could result in criminal sanctions or penalties. Hausman was 
				fired for having turned in her employer to the state. She sued 
				for wrongful discharge, claiming the public policy exception. 
				The court distinguished this whistle-blowing case from the 
				Bushko case, noting that Hausman’s conduct went beyond being 
				merely praiseworthy, but was the performance of a duty imposed 
				by several statutes, the avoidance of which would have subjected 
				her to criminal prosecution. The court decided that compliance 
				with legal obligations is protected under the public policy 
				exception.      
				Wrongful discharge claims based on tort protect the employees 
				and promote good public policy. The courts have warned companies 
				that they may no longer fire employees for any reason, namely 
				those violating public policy. In Kempfer v. Automated 
				Furnishings, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 564 N.W. 2d 692 (1997),
				
				http://www.wisbar.org/Wis/95-0649.htm the employee was fired 
				after refusing his supervisor’s order to drive a truck without a 
				commercial driver’s license. Kempfer had driven it once before 
				but had been advised by police not to drive it again without the 
				proper license. When he informed his supervisor of the 
				importance of the license, his supervisor ignored the warning 
				and proceeded to demand that Kempfer drive illegally. When 
				Kempfer refused, he was fired. He sued for wrongful discharge. 
				The court ruled that his case was within the protection of the 
				public policy exception set forth by Brockmeyer, so he was 
				awarded back pay and reinstated.      
				In Tatge v. Chambers & Owen Inc., 219 Wis.2d 99, 579 N.W.2d 217 
				(1998),
				
				http://www.wisbar.org/Wis2/95-2928.htm the supreme court 
				held that an employer was not liable for wrongful discharge when 
				it fired an employee because of the employee's refusal to sign a 
				non-compete agreement. The employee claimed that the non-compete 
				agreement was void, as an illegal restraint of trade, pursuant 
				to Section 102.465, Wis. Stats., in that it did not contain any 
				geographical or durational limitations as required by the 
				statute. The court did not believe that the statute created a 
				fundamental, well-defined public policy of the state. Therefore, 
				the employer was justified in discharging the employee for his 
				refusal to sign the non-compete agreement, even though the 
				agreement was inconsistent with the statute. In order to avoid 
				making all restrictive covenant cases wrongful discharge cases, 
				the court allowed the discharge for the employee's refusal to 
				sign, but commented that he could have litigated the validity of 
				the covenant if the employer ever was sought to enforce it.     
				Contract and tort laws have weakened the once strong employment 
				at-will doctrine to one that is now more reasonable and fair to 
				employees. These cases and others have set forth the exceptions 
				to the rules while still upholding the employer’s right to 
				maintain control over the company.  |