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								INTRODUCTION 
								    
								Involuntary discharge from employment often 
								comes as a surprise to an employee. The question 
								that arises in such circumstances is whether the 
								employee has any legal recourse. Many employees 
								who believe that they were unfairly terminated 
								mistakenly assume that they have a right to 
								reinstatement, and a remedy for consequential 
								damages, including back pay. Whether such rights 
								and remedies exist often depends on how the 
								courts apply the well known but often-assailed 
								at-will employment doctrine or one of its 
								numerous exceptions. 
								    The 
								at-will employment doctrine basically provides 
								that an employer may terminate an at-will 
								employee at any time, for a good reason, for a 
								bad reason, or for no reason at all. Wisconsin 
								has followed this general rule since the 
								nineteenth century case of Prentice v. Ledyard, 
								28 Wis 131 (1877). The logic is that unless 
								otherwise agreed, all employment is presumed to 
								be for an indefinite term, terminable at the 
								will or whim of either the employer or the 
								employee without advance notice. Each day 
								constitutes a new agreement, neither creating 
								rights nor duties from one party to the other. 
								    There are 
								many exceptions, so numerous that they almost, 
								but not quite, swallow the rule. The exceptions 
								fall into several categories. 
								ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
								    
								Termination from employment is wrongful if it is 
								in violation of federal or state 
								anti-discrimination laws based on age, race, 
								creed, color, handicap, marital status, sex, 
								national origin, ancestry, arrest record, 
								conviction record, membership in the national 
								guard, state defense force or any reserve 
								component of the military forces, or use or 
								nonuse of lawful products off the employer's 
								premises during nonworking hours. See for 
								example, Title VII of the federal Civil Rights 
								Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981; the federal Age 
								Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621; 
								the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
								U.S.C. 12111; and the Wisconsin Fair Employment 
								Act, Wis. Stats. Section 111.321-111.395. See 
								also statutes proscribing termination based on 
								an employee's union activities, National Labor 
								Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 and Wis. Stats. 
								Section 111.06(1) (c)1; jury service, Wis. 
								Stats. Section 756.25(1); wage garnishment, Wis. 
								Stats. Section 812.235; refusal to submit to 
								honesty testing, Wis.Stats. Section 111.37(4); 
								being subpoenaed to testify at an OSHA 
								proceeding, Wis.Stats. Section 101.595; or 
								suffering a compensable worker's compensation 
								illness or injury, Wis. Stats. Section 102.35.
								 
								    The 
								assertion that an employer wrongfully discharged 
								an employee because the employee made a worker's 
								compensation claim requires proof that the 
								employer, without reasonable cause, refused to 
								rehire an employee who was injured in the course 
								of employment, even though suitable employment 
								was available within the employee's work 
								restrictions. Such claims are usually quite 
								difficult. The employee must prove the 
								employment status at the time of the compensable 
								work-related injury, the loss of time from work 
								for any reason, an attempt to return to work, a 
								medical release to return to work with or 
								without restrictions, and the employer’s refusal 
								to rehire the employee because of the injury. 
								The employer has the burden of showing 
								reasonable cause for discharge or lack of 
								availability of suitable employment within the 
								employee’s restrictions. See Great Northern 
								Corp. v. LIRC, 189 Wis.2d 313, 525 N.W.2d 361 
								(Ct. App. 1994) (excessive absenteeism cannot 
								include time off for work-related injury); Ray 
								Hutson Chevrolet, Inc. v. LIRC, 186 Wis.2d 118, 
								519 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1994) (elimination of 
								job during disability period was justified); 
								Universal Foods Corp. v. LIRC, 161 Wis.2d 1, 467 
								N.W.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 
								U.S. 921 (1992) (employer could not meet its 
								burden that employee was unable to do the work 
								and that no other suitable work was available). 
								Other case examples follow: Dalco Metal Products 
								v. LIRC, 142 Wis2d 595, 419 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 
								1987) (Employee was injured, went to doctor, 
								returned to work without restrictions, and third 
								day later was fired allegedly for poor 
								production– court held for employee); Link 
								Industries, Inc. v. LIRC, 141 Wis.2d 551, 415 
								N.W.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1987)(Employee cut finger, 
								obtained bandage, went to emergency room, 
								returned to work next day, and took off the 
								following day to see personal doctor. Employee 
								was fired following day. Court held for 
								employee); West Allis School Distr. v. DILHR, 
								116 Wis.2d 410, 342 N.W.2d 415 (1984) (Back 
								injury. Prior to return to work, employer took 
								steps to lay employee off. Employer had no 
								intention of allowing employee to return to work 
								indefinitely. Less than one month after return 
								to work, employee was laid off permanently, and 
								replaced by new worker. Court held that lay-off 
								was in bad faith); L& H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 
								114 Wis.2d 504, 339 N.W.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983) 
								(Back injury. Termination during healing period. 
								Firing based solely on existence of injury 
								without benefit of competent medical opinion 
								that injury would permanently prevent return to 
								work. Court held for employee). 
								    A further 
								discussion of anti-discrimination laws is beyond 
								the scope of this essay. 
								GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEE LAWS 
								    The law 
								governing termination from governmental 
								employment is different from the law governing 
								termination from private, non-governmental 
								employment. Certain constitutional and statutory 
								provisions create property rights to continued 
								employment that cannot be infringed without due 
								process of law. See Cleveland Bd. of Education 
								v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of 
								Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Arneson v. 
								Jezwinski, 217 Wis.2d 288, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999)
								 
								    The 
								discussion will be limited to contract and tort 
								law. An outline of the law is provided so that 
								parties may consider their rights.  
								CONTRACT LAW 
								    The 
								general principle underlying the employment 
								at-will doctrine allows no remedy to the 
								employee for discharge from employment. If the 
								general rule applies, and no exceptions apply, 
								the employer may terminate an employee with 
								impunity and without advance notice. Likewise, 
								an employee may quit the employment for any 
								reason and without notice. There is no remedy to 
								the aggrieved party in either case. 
								    Despite 
								the existence, ubiquity and notoriety of the 
								general rule, there is much litigation regarding 
								wrongful discharge. Express contracts and 
								implied contracts can be created through 
								employment handbooks, company rules and policy 
								documents. When an employer assures the employee 
								that the employee is employed for a definite 
								period of time, the employee has grounds for a 
								wrongful discharge claim if prematurely fired 
								without "just cause." Likewise, if an employer 
								assures the employee that the employee will not 
								be discharged unless just cause exists, such as 
								violation of company policy or rules made 
								apparent to the employee, the employer may be 
								subject to a wrongful discharge cause of action 
								for arbitrary termination of the employee.
								 
								    In Ferraro 
								v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N. W. 2d 666 
								(1985), the supreme court held that an employee 
								handbook could modify an at-will employment 
								relationship, and create a right to continued 
								employment indefinitely, in the absence of just 
								cause for discharge. The employee was hired as a 
								hotel security guard on an at-will basis, but 
								soon thereafter was asked by the hotel to sign a 
								statement in an employee handbook that spelled 
								out all the terms and conditions of employment, 
								including discharge procedures. The employee 
								handbook recited the policies and rules of the 
								employment and Ferraro's acceptance of those 
								regulations as a condition of his continued 
								employment. In addition, the handbook provided a 
								layoff procedure based on seniority; 
								distinctions between probationary and 
								non-probationary employees, including 
								disciplinary procedures; a progressive procedure 
								for discipline based on the number and 
								seriousness of rule violations; discharge only 
								for "just cause"; and a promise from Ferraro 
								that he would provide a two-week notice before 
								leaving the employment.  
								    In this 
								case, the court held that the rules and 
								procedures to which both parties had agreed in 
								writing, and for which consideration was given, 
								created an express contract between the parties. 
								When Ferraro subsequently abused a hotel guest 
								for a parking violation, the hotel interviewed 
								the guest and other witnesses, determined that 
								there were grounds for discharge, and fired the 
								employee. Ferraro filed suit for wrongful 
								discharge. The supreme court ruled in favor of 
								the hotel, holding that although the handbook 
								constituted an express contract between the 
								parties that eliminated the at-will 
								relationship, there was no credible evidence to 
								show that the hotel breached that contract in 
								any way. The hotel had followed the discharge 
								procedure by performing an investigation of the 
								act and had just cause to discharge the 
								employee. This case is important for the 
								landmark holding that an employment handbook may 
								convert an employment at-will relationship into 
								one that can be terminated only by adherence to 
								contractual terms in the handbook. 
								    Sometimes 
								an employer will provide behavioral guidelines 
								to employees that are presumed by some to create 
								express contracts for employment. These usually 
								are not enforced in court, however, unless the 
								employer creates specific rules or procedures 
								for discharge that create an agreed employment 
								relationship made conditional on those terms.
								 
								    In Bantz 
								v. Montgomery Estates, Inc., 163 Wis.2d 973, 473 
								N.W.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1991), an employee claimed 
								that a handbook outlining regulations and 
								disciplinary procedures, an employee conduct 
								policy statement, and a manual prescribing a 
								schedule of progressive discipline converted an 
								employment-at-will relationship to a contractual 
								one that could not be terminated without just 
								cause. The employee was fired from her position 
								as cashier at a resort for allegedly failing to 
								report a miscount in change. The court of 
								appeals held that because the employer's written 
								publications were only "guidelines", and not 
								contractual promises, the at-will relationship 
								endured, and the discharge was not required to 
								be for just cause. Therefore, the employee had 
								no remedy even if the discharge was arbitrary 
								and capricious. 
								    In Wolf v. 
								F & M Banks, 193 Wis. 2d 439, 534 N. W. 2d 877 
								(Ct. App. 1995), an employee sued for wrongful 
								discharge after he was fired for "poor 
								performance." Wolf claimed that his employment 
								had been converted from an at-will relationship 
								to one bound by the terms of a contract formed 
								through a code of ethics document presented to 
								him by the employer. According to the code, Wolf 
								was entitled to an explanation of any alleged 
								infraction. Wolf argued that this prevented him 
								from being fired at-will. The court disagreed. 
								The court ruled that an employer does not 
								abandon an at-will relationship simply because 
								an employee is given an explanation of subpar 
								performance and an opportunity to plead his 
								case. The court also noted that Wolf had signed 
								an agreement for an at-will employment 
								relationship and that the code included a clause 
								explicitly stating that no express or other 
								employment relationship or contract was created 
								through the document. There were no specific 
								rules or procedures, but rather, only guidelines 
								in the code, and no express conditions for 
								employment. 
								    An implied 
								contract for continued employment in the absence 
								of just cause for discharge may be created by 
								the mutual intent of both parties. In Garvey v. 
								Buhler, 146 Wis2d. 281, 430 N.W. 2d 616 (Ct. 
								App. 1988), Garvey sued Open Pantry for wrongful 
								discharge on the basis of breach of implied 
								contract, created between Open Pantry and Garvey 
								through a combination of documents, including a 
								liquor sales policy, company rules, employee 
								manuals, and her understanding of a warning 
								policy. Garvey claimed that there was a pink 
								slip warning procedure providing that an 
								employee could be fired only after three pink 
								slips, and that she had not been afforded that 
								leniency. She also claimed that the employee 
								manuals and policy guidelines created an implied 
								contract that she could not be discharged 
								at-will. The court held that only the pink slip 
								procedure would have created an implied 
								contract, but the facts regarding the matter 
								were in dispute, so summary judgment was 
								inappropriate. No express contract were formed 
								through the handbooks or sales policies, but an 
								implied contract, if proven, would be just as 
								enforceable.  
								    If the 
								fired employee cannot prove the existence of a 
								contract and its breach by circumstantial 
								evidence, the alternative approach is to argue a 
								violation of tort law. 
								TORT LAW 
								    An 
								employer's violation of public policy in 
								terminating an employee may give rise to an 
								actionable wrongful discharge claim. The courts 
								will not allow an employer to fire an employee 
								for refusing to break the law. This can be 
								referred to as the public policy exception to 
								the at-will doctrine of employment. There have 
								been many cases where the court’s decision rests 
								on the definition of public policy and how it 
								pertains to the employment situation. Employees 
								may be awarded reinstatement and back pay if 
								they can show that they were discharged for 
								refusing to violate a public policy. However, as 
								explained in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
								Wis. 2d 561, 335 N. W. 2d 834 (1983), the public 
								policy in question must be well defined and 
								supported by statutory or constitutional law.
								 
								    In 
								Brockmeyer, the court narrowed the scope of 
								public policy to existing law and decided that 
								wrongful discharge could not be based on a bad 
								faith claim. Brockmeyer was having an open 
								affair with his secretary, who, after being 
								caught, was then asked to find work elsewhere in 
								the company. After no alternative positions in 
								the company were found, the company asked for 
								and obtained her resignation. The former 
								secretary filed a sex discrimination claim 
								against the company. Dun & Bradstreet then asked 
								Brockmeyer to submit a report about the events 
								that led to the secretary’s discharge. 
								Brockmeyer refused and was fired, just days 
								after a settlement with the secretary. 
								Brockmeyer sued for wrongful discharge on the 
								grounds that the employer had a bad faith 
								motivation for his discharge. The court rejected 
								his claim, holding that good faith is not 
								required in employment termination decisions. 
								The court also clearly defined a public policy 
								exception to the rule permitting an at-will 
								employment to be terminated without a good 
								reason. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled an 
								employer may not discharge an at-will employee 
								if the discharge violates a clearly defined, 
								fundamental public policy of the state. In this 
								particular case, Dunn & Bradstreet’s actions did 
								not violate any clearly defined public policy.
								 
								    This 
								narrow exception to the at-will rule was devised 
								in order to allow management to maintain control 
								over its business and to avoid frivolous 
								lawsuits. The employee making the claim for 
								wrongful discharge has the burden to identify a 
								specific provision of law that was violated by 
								the employer in consummating the discharge. The 
								burden then shifts to the employer who must 
								prove just cause for the termination. In this 
								case, Brockmeyer failed to show there was a 
								violation of a fundamental public policy. 
								 
								    In Wandry 
								v. Bull’s Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 384 
								N.W. 2d 325 (1986), the court provided a guide 
								for wrongful discharge claims premised upon a 
								violation of public policy. Wandry was 
								discharged for not reimbursing her employer the 
								amount of a stolen check she had mistakenly 
								cashed for a customer. In order to win on a 
								wrongful discharge claim, Wandry had to prove 
								she was protected by public policy from such a 
								dismissal. Wandry had to look at the Brockmeyer 
								case and follow some crucial steps to win. 
								First, she was required to identify a 
								fundamental and well-defined public policy 
								backed by statutory or constitutional law. 
								Second, she had to prove that there was a 
								violation of that policy in the discharge. 
								Wandry found a provision in the state statutes, 
								section 103.455, Wis. Stats., that protects 
								employees from employers who seek reimbursement 
								for work-related losses, though the exact 
								wording of the statute did not match Wandry’s 
								case. The court held that an employee who was 
								discharged for refusing to allow her employer to 
								deduct a business loss from her paycheck had a 
								valid cause of action for wrongful discharge. 
								    The court 
								narrowed this public policy exception in Bushko 
								v. Miller Brewing Co.,134 Wis.2d 136, 396 N.W. 
								2d 167 (1986). In this case, Bushko complained 
								numerous times to management about the company’s 
								alleged unlawful acts of hazardous disposal, 
								safety policies, and record keeping. He 
								subsequently was fired and sued for wrongful 
								discharge under the public policy exception. The 
								court ruled that the exception did not apply in 
								his case because he was not asked or encouraged 
								to act or participate in the alleged illegal 
								acts. The court referred back to the Brockmeyer 
								case, noting that the public policy exception 
								applies only if the employer demands that the 
								employee contribute to an illegal act, and where 
								that participation is a condition of continued 
								employment. In this case, Bushko was merely 
								obeying the law and though his actions were 
								praiseworthy, he never was asked to partake in 
								the alleged misconduct.  
								    It was 
								well established in the above cases that an 
								employee could not be fired for refusing to 
								violate the public policy of this state, as it 
								appears in the state constitution or a statute. 
								An unresolved question existed until 1992, as to 
								whether an employee could be fired for refusing 
								to violate an administrative procedure that 
								appears in the Wisconsin Administrative Code. 
								The public policy definition was expanded to 
								include administrative provisions as well, in 
								Winkelman v. Beloit Mem. Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d12, 
								483 N.W. 2d 211 (1992). Winkelman was a nurse 
								who had spent 16 years in the maternity ward 
								when she was unexpectedly ordered to "float" to 
								another department of the hospital unfamiliar to 
								her, where additional staffing was needed. She 
								refused to work in that area, believing that she 
								was unqualified to do work outside the maternity 
								ward, and went home. She was later informed that 
								her leaving constituted a voluntary resignation, 
								from which she could not be reinstated. She sued 
								for wrongful discharge, claiming the public 
								policy exception to the at-will employment 
								relationship, and cited a Wisconsin 
								Administrative Code section as support for her 
								recalcitrance. The cited section provided that a 
								registered nurse could be disciplined by the 
								licensing authorities for performing services 
								for which the nurse was not qualified, and that 
								such conduct constituted negligence. The court 
								upheld her refusal to accept the transfer to an 
								alien department for which she was untrained and 
								incompetent, and ruled that her discharge for 
								that reason was wrongful, in violation of 
								administrative code. The significance of the 
								case is the holding that where a fundamental and 
								well-defined public policy is evidenced by an 
								administrative rule, a discharge for refusal to 
								violate that public policy is actionable. 
								    The 
								whistle-blower act of an employee, as in Bushko, 
								is a very narrow exception to the at-will 
								employment doctrine. The court in Hausman v. St. 
								Croix Care Center, 214 Wis. 2d 654, 571 N.W. 2d 
								393 (1997),
								
								http://www.wisbar.org/Wis/96-0866.htm 
								distinguished its ruling from the holding in the 
								Bushko case in whistle-blower situations. 
								Hausman was a nurse at a nursing home. She 
								notified the administrators numerous times of 
								apparent neglect and abuse of patients. After 
								the management took no action, Hausman informed 
								a state official in charge of investigation of 
								nursing home practices, in accordance with 
								several statutes regarding abuse and neglect in 
								nursing homes. According to the statutes, nurses 
								were obligated to inform the state or local 
								officials in case of any such abuse. Moreover, a 
								nurse's failure to do so could result in 
								criminal sanctions or penalties. Hausman was 
								fired for having turned in her employer to the 
								state. She sued for wrongful discharge, claiming 
								the public policy exception. The court 
								distinguished this whistle-blowing case from the 
								Bushko case, noting that Hausman’s conduct went 
								beyond being merely praiseworthy, but was the 
								performance of a duty imposed by several 
								statutes, the avoidance of which would have 
								subjected her to criminal prosecution. The court 
								decided that compliance with legal obligations 
								is protected under the public policy exception.
								 
								    Wrongful 
								discharge claims based on tort protect the 
								employees and promote good public policy. The 
								courts have warned companies that they may no 
								longer fire employees for any reason, namely 
								those violating public policy. In Kempfer v. 
								Automated Furnishings, Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 
								564 N.W. 2d 692 (1997),
								
								http://www.wisbar.org/Wis/95-0649.htm the 
								employee was fired after refusing his 
								supervisor’s order to drive a truck without a 
								commercial driver’s license. Kempfer had driven 
								it once before but had been advised by police 
								not to drive it again without the proper 
								license. When he informed his supervisor of the 
								importance of the license, his supervisor 
								ignored the warning and proceeded to demand that 
								Kempfer drive illegally. When Kempfer refused, 
								he was fired. He sued for wrongful discharge. 
								The court ruled that his case was within the 
								protection of the public policy exception set 
								forth by Brockmeyer, so he was awarded back pay 
								and reinstated.  
								    In Tatge 
								v. Chambers & Owen Inc., 219 Wis.2d 99, 579 
								N.W.2d 217 (1998),
								
								http://www.wisbar.org/Wis2/95-2928.htm the 
								supreme court held that an employer was not 
								liable for wrongful discharge when it fired an 
								employee because of the employee's refusal to 
								sign a non-compete agreement. The employee 
								claimed that the non-compete agreement was void, 
								as an illegal restraint of trade, pursuant to 
								Section 102.465, Wis. Stats., in that it did not 
								contain any geographical or durational 
								limitations as required by the statute. The 
								court did not believe that the statute created a 
								fundamental, well-defined public policy of the 
								state. Therefore, the employer was justified in 
								discharging the employee for his refusal to sign 
								the non-compete agreement, even though the 
								agreement was inconsistent with the statute. In 
								order to avoid making all restrictive covenant 
								cases wrongful discharge cases, the court 
								allowed the discharge for the employee's refusal 
								to sign, but commented that he could have 
								litigated the validity of the covenant if the 
								employer ever was sought to enforce it. 
								    Contract 
								and tort laws have weakened the once strong 
								employment at-will doctrine to one that is now 
								more reasonable and fair to employees. These 
								cases and others have set forth the exceptions 
								to the rules while still upholding the 
								employer’s right to maintain control over the 
								company.  |